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Abstract
An essential part of local fiscal policy is the choice of the tax base.
In this paper, we take four criteria to evaluate tax bases, namely:
efficiency, simplicity, flexibility, and fairness. The results of such an
evaluation highly depend on how we describe the involved agents. We
construct a two stage model of a local economy with three types of
agents: Leviathans, households, and housing firms. Each Leviathan
seeks to maximize the surplus of his local fiscal budget. Each house-
hold seeks to maximize its life-time utility from three types of goods:
composite private goods, housing, and local public goods. Each hous-
ing firm seeks to maximize its profits. In this model, we analyze the
characteristics of four distinct tax bases: land rent, housing capital
rent, housing sales, and housing property. In particular, we analyze
the responses of the households, the housing firms, and the housing
prices on a change of a specific tax rate. The results are used to
evaluate each tax base with respect to our four criteria.
Keywords: Leviathan, tax base, exit option, sensitivity analysis
JEL Classification: H11, H21, R51
1 The Evaluation of Tax Bases
In a strict sense, any governmental activity implies taxation. In the real
world, there is nothing without costs. The essential feature of a government
is that it has a monopoly on the legal use of physical force. Hence, it may
use its physical force to cover its costs. Taxation means that a government
forces some group to pay a contribution, without offering a specific service in
return. The contributing group is defined via a certain tax base. In theory,
the tax base could be anything. Normally, it belongs to one of these classes:
income, wealth, or consumption. The size of a contribution is defined via the
respective tax tariff. In theory, the tariff could have any structure. Basically,
three classes are distinguished: progressive, proportional, or regressive.
A government is supposed to use its power to tax, in the general interest.
Economists have contrived various criteria to evaluate taxes.1 Now, there
exists a wide consensus that a tax ought to have the following features:
1. Efficiency: A tax is efficient, if it supports the optimal allocation of
resources.
2. Simplicity: In general, the more simple a tax is, the less it incurs
compliance or administration costs.
3. Flexibility: Economic conditions may change. The more flexible a tax
is, the less adaptation costs arise.
4. Fairness: A tax is considered as fair, if it treats every citizen according
to some general procedure and to her relative economic condition.
But, it seems hardly possible to make a final judgement on whether a
specific tax is in the general interest, or not. For instance: Is a (proportional)
sales tax better than a (progressive) property tax? - We cannot really answer
this. There are at least three factors which make a tax evaluation more
difficult:
1. Interdependence of criteria: There may exist connections between cer-
tain criteria: positive or negative ones.
2. Motivation of tax payers: Because the tax payers are forced, their
responses do not reveal their true preferences.
3. Motivation of the government: The impact of a tax may depend on the
government’s motivation.
The next two subsections present two different approaches on the gov-
ernment’s motivation. Section 2 recapitulates some major arguments about
efficiency in the provision of local public goods. In Section 3, a two stage
1One salient proposition was made by Smith (1776). He set up the following four
criteria: 1) equity; 2) certainty; 3) convenience; 4) administrative economy. For more
about the respective discussion, see Musgrave (1986, 2000).
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model is developped which shall help to understand and to evalute four local
tax bases. First, a general framework is entroduced, then the framework is
adapted to each of the four tax bases. In the last section, a brief evaluation
of each tax bases is made.
1.1 The Social Welfare Maximizer Approach
In the social welfare maximizer approach, the government is conceived as
monolithic and benevolent. In principal, it is asked which tax a government
should choose to improve the total market outcomes. The government is nor-
mally supposed to have full knowledge. There are no obstructions in the tax
implementation. Nevertheless, it is recognized that taxes can hardly generate
perfect solutions. The reason can be depicted as follows: The only tax which
does not generate deadweight losses is the lump-sum tax. However, such a
tax can hardly be considered as fair. Thus, the social welfare maximizer ap-
proach adopts a second best approach. The respective theory explains why
it may be welfare improving to deviate from a first best condition, if another
first best condition cannot be met. Together, these two approaches coincide
with a third one, called ’optimal taxation’.
A fundamental contribution to the optimal taxation approach was made
by Ramsey (1927). Ramsey asked how a government could minimize the
deadweight loss, if it wants to generate a certain amount of revenue by
commodity taxes. He set up a model in which a representative (producer-
consumer) household maximizes its net utility, given a finite set of commodi-
ties. The net prices that this households pays correspond to the commodity
related taxes. The government has all the relevant information. Its opti-
mization exhibits the following rule: Each commodity tax rate has to be
stipulated in such a manner that a marginal change of any single tax rate
would lead to the same marginal change in the (compensated) demand for
all commodities (’Ramsey rule’). If the demand for each commodity is inde-
pendent of the prices for others, then another rule appears: Each tax rate
has to be inversely proportional to the (compensated) price elasticity of the
demand for the related commodity (’inverse-elasticity rule’).2
The optimal taxation approach has been further developed in various
directions. Further aspects have been examined, such as: pre-existing dis-
tortions, externatlities, the impact of public expenditure, or risk.3 In many
models, the optimal tax is derived with the help of a social welfare function.
Then, the specific function implicitly determines the importance of the the
2For an introduction into the optimal taxation approach, see Stiglitz (2000), chapter
20; for a more formal treatment, see Auerbach (1985).
3One salient contribution was made by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
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different tax criteria. The central issue thus becomes how to justify a specific
choice. Depending on the form of the function, any tax could turn out to
be optimal. Hence, there has been an intensive discussion over the ’right’
form of the social welfare function. Today, some consensus might include the
following assertions:
• The marginal utility of the individual income is decreasing.
• The marginal cost of an individual good is decreasing.
• The marginal deadweight loss of substitution activity is increasing.
• The aggregation of the utility should follow some (adapted) maximin
principle.
However, since this approach considers the government as benevolent and
fully informed, tax criteria such as simplicity of flexibility become irrelevant.
Moreover, there appears no reason why the power of the government should
be divided. Optimal taxation normally takes place in a centralized state.
Anyway, as Arrow (1951) showed, it is impossible to derive a social welfare
function from a relevant set of axioms. Thus, the respective results of the
optimal taxation approach can hardly be robust.
1.2 The Leviathan Approach
In the Leviathan approach, the government is conceived as monolithic and
self-interested. The assumption of the self-interest can be justified by at
least three reasons: First, it bases on the ’homo economicus’ approach. It is
thus consistent with the standard economic models of households or firms.
Second, the assumption is rather pessimistic. It conforms to a risk-averse
social policy. And third, evolutionary models in general suggest that a self-
interested government would dominate benevolent ones. Thus, the Leviathan
approach mainly deals with two simultaneous problems: the provision of
public goods and the constraints on governments. To provide public goods
gets problematic due to the free-rider option. To constrain governments gets
problematic due to the monopoly on the legal use of physical force.
Hence, private and public agents differ less in their general motivation
but more in their general options. In particular, a government can decide
how to tax; and a citizen can decide how to react on different taxes. It
may be stipulated by a (fiscal) constitution which modes of taxation and
which modes of reaction are permissible. On the one hand, the modes of
taxation have three major elements: the base, the tariff, and the amount of
revenue. A constitution directly constrains a government by restricting these
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elements. On the other hand, two modes of reaction can be divided: ’voice’
and ’exit’. A constitution indirectly constrains a government by arranging
and protecting these modes. Thus, the Leviathan approach coincides with
the constitutional approach.
A fundamental analytical framework for a constitutional approach was
set up by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). They asked how the power to tax
could be best constrained by constitutional rules. Brennan and Buchanan
specified Leviathan as a tax revenue maximizer. They analyzed his behavior
in various tax settings. In a setting with income taxes, Leviathan is allowed
to choose his optimal tariff. As the two authors could show, he would choose
a regressive tariff because it counters the incentives for the citizens to substi-
tute leisure for labor. He would transfer then all of the social income (beyond
some subsistence level) to his own budget. Nothing of the tax revenue would
be spent on public goods. Therefore, Brennan and Buchanan recommended
to stipulate a certain income tax tariff and a certain yardstick for public ex-
penditure into the constitution. Overall, they found support for constraints,
such as: narrowing of tax bases, proportional tax rates, ear-marking, or de-
centralization.4
The Leviathan approach has been further developed in some directions.
One can already discern some consensus on the treatment of the tax crite-
ria. Central features of this treatment are: First, efficiency: The Leviathan
approach measures efficiency by both, deadweight loss and tax misuse. Ba-
sically, there exists a trade-off between the two. The citizens can constrain
tax misuse by voice or by exit. Each of these modes incurs a specific type
of competition; each has its specific costs and benefits. The efficiency of a
tax may depend on the specific supply of public goods. Second, simplicity:
Information and transaction costs are taken into consideration. Such costs
tend to induce asymmetries between the Leviathan and the citizens. The
Leviathan can use such asymmetries to increase his tax misuse. The simpler
a tax is, the less information and transaction costs are induced. Third, flexi-
bility: Constitutional constraints are stipulated in a long-run perspective. In
order to adapt to short-run requirements, they need to be flexible. In a fa-
vorable sense, the constraints are supposed to work as automatic stabilizers.
And fourth, fairness: The Leviathan approach regards consent as the high-
est norm of fairness. Consent may be reached, if the citizens stand behind a
’veil of ignorance’. Behind such a veil, they do not know their social position
in a future, postconstitutional period. Thus, any citizen orientates his vote
towards the common interest.5
4See also Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1979).
5See also Findlay/ Wilson (1987).
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2 Local Fiscal Policy
The costs of reaction to fiscal policy depend on the government structure.
Generally, these costs will be the lower, the more decentralized the public
sector is. This can be explained by the existence of region specific capi-
tal. Region specific capital may improve the efficiency of any region specific
decision. The costs of such capital negatively depends on the size of the
respective region. The capital gets lost, if the owner exits. One may ask,
subsequently: What are the gains of reaction to fiscal policy?
Tiebout (1956) examined an extreme case in which the exit costs are
zero. He claimed that the exit mode could incur efficiency in the provision
of public goods. In his local setting, each jurisdiction is governed by a ’city
manager’. Each city manager seeks to maximize the profits of his jurisdiction.
He offers a special, fixed package of local public goods and charges a head
tax. A citizen can choose a special package by moving to the respective
jurisdiction. She ’votes with her feet’ and thus reveals her true preferences.
Depending on the actual number of local residents, a city manager promotes
entry or exit. The competition between the city managers puts their profits
under pressure. In the total equilibrium, they all have zero profits. Further
equilibrium conditions are:
• perfect market transparency;
• no scale economies;
• no spillovers;
• local independence of private income; and
• the range of public offerings covers the range of the citizens’ preferences.
Tiebout admitted that the equilibrium conditions are altogether enormously
demanding. Nonetheless, he believed that his setting allows to derive the
right policy rules. These should in particular help to lower the exit costs.6
Buchanan and Goetz (1972), however, found fault with the Tiebout set-
ting as a reference for public policy. In particular, they argued that it ne-
glects inherent inefficiencies caused by the ’fact of location’. Thus, it rather
describes an adjustment process in a non-spatial world of voluntary clubs. In
this setting, nothing prevents the citizens from optimizing both at the same
time: the private and the public goods consumption. In a spatial world,
by contrast, a citizen’s move from one jurisdiction to another affects social
6For a general discussion, see Mueller (2003), chapter 9.
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benefits and average costs, in both jurisdictions. The choice of local public
goods induces externalities.7
Hamilton (1975) regarded the criticism by Buchanan and Goetz as rather
empirical. As he showed, a spatial Tiebout model may have an efficient out-
come, if some more specific assumptions on the cost and the utility functions
are made. But, not to depend on such specific assumptions, Hamilton sug-
gested to extend the spatial Tiebout model by a constructed price system
for local public goods. This price system has two basic elements: First, the
local government imposes a proportional property tax. Second, it imposes a
minimum of housing consumption. The system roughly works as follows: If
a citizen lives in a jurisdiction where the legal minimum of housing consump-
tion is below her personal optimum, then she will move to a jurisdiction with
a higher minimum. The reason is that the average tax base in the latter ju-
risdiction will become broader. The respective government gets the option to
increase its provision of public goods or to decrease its property tax rate. At
the end of the adjustment process, the local economy reaches an equilibrium
in which:
• each jurisdiction is internally homogeneous;
• the capitalization rates of the property taxes are all zero;
• the local governments do not redistribute any income;
• the consumption structure is Pareto efficient.8
Thus, the exit mode generates efficiency gains in the provision of local
public goods. But, it also incurs externalities, since it is connected with
land and housing. Under general conditions, such externalities might lead to
distortions in the use of land, housing, and local public goods. To avoid these
distortions, a government can impose zoning measures. Zoning measures
restrict the use of land and housing. Externalities can thus be internalized.
But, zoning measures increase a government’s power. How this power affects
the total efficiency, depends on the government’s objective.
Epple and Zelenitz (1981) modified the Tiebout setting to examine whether
the exit mode by itself can be sufficient to generate a Pareto efficient out-
come. In their model, the jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and there are
no exit costs. Each government seeks to maximize its profits. It decides on
its amount of local public goods and its property tax rate. The local public
goods are in fact publicly provided private goods. Housing is supplied by
7Foundations for a theory of clubs were laid in Buchanan (1965).
8See also Hamilton (1976).
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competitive firms. All citizens have identical incomes and preferences. Util-
ity is a function of a composite private good, housing, and the local public
goods. The local economy reaches an equilibrium, if:
• each citizen is housed in exactly one jurisdiction;
• each local housing market clears; and
• the utility level is equal in each jurisdiction.
Epple and Zelenitz analyzed the sensitivity of such an equilibrium. They
found out the following: If a government raises its property tax rate, then
local residents exit, the net price of housing falls. However, the impact of an
increase in local public goods is not totally clear, due to the complementary
relationship between local public goods and housing. Under special condi-
tions, the housing price can rise and the number of residents fall. These
results turn out to be independent of a government’s objective. However,
this does not hold for the distribution of income. Epple and Zelenitz found
out that a Leviathan is able to misuse some tax revenue. The main reason is
that the jurisdictionary boundaries are fixed. A Leviathan thus usurps the
part of the land rent which stems from the elasticity of the housing supply.
The higher the number of jurisdictions in the economy is, the lower will be
the misuse. However, it never can be totally prevented by exit.
Thus, the exit mode takes up two important tasks: First, it serves as a
mechanism for revealing preferences. If a citizen moves from one jurisdiction
to another which is only different in its fiscal package, then she reveals that
she prefers this package. Second, it serves as a constraint for self-interested
governments. If a government offers a comparatively bad fiscal package, then
the exit mode will induce negative consequences for this government. - Gen-
erally, the exit mode will the better execute these tasks, the less centralized
the public sector is. However, its gains depend on further factors. Some
major insights about these factors are:
• Henderson (1985): Interjurisdictional land markets may promote effi-
ciency in the total economy.
• Hoyt (1991): Due to congestion of local public goods, it may be less
efficient to tax land than to tax property.
• Henderson (1995): To fincance local public goods, homeowners would
choose a head or a land tax rather than a property tax.
• Hoyt (1999): In smaller jurisdictions, citizens have stronger incentives
to constrain Leviathan, due to higher capitalization rates.
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• Caplan (2001): If the capitalization rate of a tax equals 1, then a land-
or a homeowner cannot constrain Leviathan by exit. She either pays
the tax or loses the respective amount in a sale.
3 A Two Stage Model of Local Taxation
The characteristics of a local economy are mainly based on the fact of loca-
tion. The fact of location means that the economy is connected with land;
which is neither changeable nor replicable. These two characteristics of land
impose constraints on the whole economy. The constraints are particularly
effective with respect to two types of goods: housing and local public goods.
The utility that a housing unit offers depends on its specific location. Each
housing market thus becomes a heterogeneous monopoly. Due to connection
with land, there arises rivalness in the use of local public goods. Thus, some
mechanism is needed to coordinate the demand for such goods.
Altogether, a model of a local economy shall help to describe and explain
the relationships between land, housing, and fiscal policy. In order to reach
this, strong simplifications are needed. We may argue that earlier models
have not taken the right choice of simplifications for our specific purposes.
Hence, we shall construct a new one.9
3.1 The Framework
Our local economy consists of o = 1, 2, ..., J¯ regions. We take J¯ as being large.
Each region has the same land size; which is denoted by L¯o. The land size of
the total economy is thus: L¯ = J¯ L¯o. There are three different types of agents:
Leviathans, households, and housing firms. Each type is homogeneous. Each
region is governed by a Leviathan. In the total economy, there are as many
households as housing firms, namely N¯ , with N¯ > J¯ . The agents interact in
two stages:
In stage 1, each household gets endowed with a parcel of land of the same
size:
l¯o =
L¯o
N¯o
;
where N¯o is the number of land owners in region o. Thus:
N¯o =
N¯
J¯
.
9Similar model structures can be found in Epple/ Zelenitz (1981); Bucovetsky/ Wilson
(1991); Hoyt (1991, 1999). For the equilbrium concept, see Epple/ Filimon/ Romer (1993).
For the technique of the sensitivity analysis, see Silberberg (1990).
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Each Leviathan announces his local fiscal package; which consists of: a land
rent tax rate (τlo), a housing capital rent tax rate (τko), a housing sales tax
rate (τsj), a property tax rate (τvjt), and the amount of local public goods
(Go=j). Then, each household demands housing for its own parcel of land
(hdo). The housing is supplied by the housing firms (h
s
o). They use the land
(l¯o) and housing capital (kho) as inputs. The capital is demanded on a global
market. The land rents (rlo) are left to the respective owners.
Stage 2 is divided into two periods (t = 1, 2). In the first period, the Le-
viathans implement their fiscal policies. The households are free to migrate.
They can choose the offering of local public goods that they prefer. But, they
can only consume where they reside; which we call region j. In the second
period, migration is not possible, anymore. In both periods, each household
earns a wage (wt). Its consumption consists of the following elements: a
non-durable composite private good (xjt); a durable housing good (hj); and
a durable local public good (Gj).
Thus, the three types of agents encounter the following optimization prob-
lems in our local economy:
A housing firm seeks to maximize its profit (piho). It offers its product on
a competitive, intraregional market. The price on this market is pho; which
depends on τlo, τko, and Go. In its production, the firm uses kho and l¯ho.
The market for housing capital is exogenous. The respective rent (rk) thus
is taken as constant. Since the land input comes from the demander of the
product, the land rent (rlo) is determined as a residual value. Both inputs
can be subject to taxation. Hence, the general profit function is:
piho = ρho − cho with (1)
ρho = pho(τlo, τko, Go)ho(kho, l¯ho);
cho = r¯k(1 + τko)kho + rlo(1 + τlo)l¯ho.
A household seeks to maximize its life-time utility (uj). It consumes
three types of goods (xjt, hj, Gj), in two periods (t= 1, 2), in one region (j).
The utility that it gets from the local public good (ug) does not depend on
the consumed amounts of the other two goods. With the choice of xjt, the
household introduces a time preference factor (β) into its calculation. Hence,
the general utility function is:
uj =
∑
t
βt−1ut(xjt, hj) + ug(Gj). (2)
The household receives incomes from two sources: land and labor. Its rel-
evant land rent (rlo) is determined in its region of origin (o), in stage 1. Its
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wage (wt) is determined exogenously, in each period of stage 2. The house-
hold can vary the disposability of its life-time income (yo) via an exogenous
financial capital market, at an interest rate r¯y. It spends its income on xjt
and hj. The prices that it pays are pxt and phj. The latter price depends on
the whole market for local public goods. Hence, the general income function
is described by:
yo =
∑
t
yot = rlol¯o +
∑
t
(1 + r¯y)
−(t−1)wt with (3)
yo1 = γ1yo = px1xj1 + phj(~τsj, [τvjt] , ~Gj)(1 + τsj)(1 + τvj1)hj;
yo2 = (1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)yo = px2xj2 + phj(~τsj, [τvjt] , ~Gj)τvj2hj.
A Leviathan seeks to maximize his fiscal budget surplus (So=j). There
are four different local tax bases (z). Each tax generates a specific amount of
revenue (Rzo=zj). Depending on the tax institutions, the Leviathan spends
a specific share of the revenue for local public goods (αz). Hence, the fiscal
budget surplus is formally described by:
So=j =
∑
z
(1− αz)Rzo=zj with (4)
Rlo = N¯oτlorlol¯ho;
Rko = N¯oτkor¯kkho;
Rsj = Njτsjphjhj;
Rvj = Nj
∑
t
τvjt (1 + r¯y)
(t−1) phjhj.
In our local economy, interaction takes place in two stages. Each stage
has its own equilibrium.
In stage 1, the regional boundaries are closed. Every agent is merely
informed about her own region. A region o reaches an (internal) equilibrium
under two conditions:
First, the households satisfy their individual housing demands:
hdo = h
s
o. (5)
Second, the housing firms make no profits:
pio = 0. (6)
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In stage 2, the regional boundaries are opened. Thus, every agent gets
informed about the relevant variables and parameters in the total economy.
The total economy reaches an equilibrium under three conditions:
First, in each region, the total demand for housing equals the total housing
stock:
Hdj = H
s
o=j. (7)
Second, every household lives in one and only one region:∑
j
Nj = J¯N¯o = N¯ . (8)
Third, every household reaches the same and highest possible utility level:
uj = u
∗. (9)
For the shapes of uj and cho, the standard assumptions are made. To
simplify, we can assume without any greater loss that: wt = w¯ and τvj1 = τvj2.
Table 1 gives a summary of the model’s elements.
3.2 Taxation of Land Rent
In stage 1, each household gets endowed with a parcel of land. The land is
used as an input for housing; which generates a rent. Thus, the household
receives a land rent without any previous investment. The extent of this gain
positively depends on the provision of local public goods. The costs of these
goods are taken by the local Leviathan. He incurs positive externalities
to the local land owners. Hence, it may be expedient to internalize these
externalities. One instrument for the internalization could be a land rent
tax. Next, we shall look at the effects of such a tax, in our model.
A housing firm operates on a competitive market. It chooses its capital
input such that its profit can reach zero. The land input is given. The land
rent arises as a residual value. This value is shared between the land owner
and the local Leviathan.
Formally, the optimization problem of a housing firm looks as follows:
max
kho
piho = pho(τlo, Go)ho(kho, l¯ho)− r¯kkho − rlo(1 + τlo)l¯ho. (10)
The solution to this problem is:
r¯k = pho
(
∂ho
∂kho
)
. (11)
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name interpretation
cho cost of a housing
Gj local public good in region j
hj individual consumption of housing in region j
Hdj total housing demand in region j
Hso total housing supply in o
J¯ number of regions in the economy
kho capital input for housing
l¯o land size of parcel in o
L¯o land size of region o
N¯o number of households from region o (origin)
N¯j number of households in region j (consumption)
phj external net price of housing
pho internal net price of housing
p¯xt price of the composite private good
rlo land rent
r¯k housing capital rent
r¯y interest rate
Rz public revenue from tax (base) z
So=j fiscal budget surplus
uj individual utility in region j
wt wage in period t
xtj individual consumption of composite private good in
period t and region j
yo individual life-time income from region o
yot disposable income in period t
αz share of specific tax revenue spent on local public goods
β time preference factor
γjt share of disposable income in period t
piho profit from a single housing production contract
ρho revenue from housing contract
τko tax on capital rent
τlo tax on land rent
τsj sales tax rate on housing in j
τvjt property tax rate in period t and region j
Table 1: Elements of the two stage model: summary
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Thus, the housing firm increases its capital input until the value of its
marginal product equals the capital rent. From this optimum condition, we
can derive the following sensitivity result:
dkho
dτlo
= −
∂pho
∂τlo
∂ho
∂kho
pho
∂2ho
∂k2ho
< 0. (12)
It is assumed that:
∂pho
∂τlo
< 0;
∂ho
∂kho
> 0;
∂2ho
∂k2ho
< 0.
Thus, we can state the following: A housing firm decreases (increases) its
capital input as a response to a marginal increase (decrease) of the land rent
tax.
A household maximizes its life-time utility, constrained by its life-time
income. It gets utility from the consumption in region j, in stage 2. The
land rent tax enters its calculus via its income from the region o, in stage 1.
Formally, its optimization problem looks as follows:
max
xj1,xj2,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(xj1, hj) + βu2(xj2, hj) + ug(Gj) (13)
subject to
yo = yo1 + yo2 = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ rlol¯ho;
where
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xxj1 + phj(~Gj)hj;
y2o = (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)yo = p¯xxj2;
rlol¯ho =
pho(τlo, Go)ho(kho(pho(τlo, Go)))− r¯kkho(pho(τlo, Go))
1 + τlo
.
In general, such an optimization problem can be solved in a Lagrangian
approach. In our case, however, we would have to specify the utility function.
Otherwise, it cannot be solved for x1, x2 and hj. Anyway, we are rather
interested in the household’s sensitivity towards tax rate changes. To derive
the respective results, we can do without any specification. As results, we
get:
dxj1
dτlo
= 0; (14)
dxj2
dτlo
= 0; (15)
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dhj
dτlo
=
r¯kkho − ho
(
pho − (1 + τlo)∂pho∂τlo
)
phj(1 + τlo)2
< 0; (16)
dγ1
dτlo
= (1− γ1)
r¯kkho − ho
(
pho − (1 + τlo)∂pho∂τlo
)
yo(1 + τlo)2
< 0. (17)
This holds, since:
phoho > r¯kkho + ho(1 + τlo)
∂pho
∂τlo
.
Thus, we can state the following:
A change of the land rent tax does not lead to a change of a household’s
consumption of the composite private good. But, the household changes its
housing demand and its share of first-period expenditure. These responses
are always negative. The housing demand responds the more, the higher the
capital rent is. The share of first-period expenditure responds the more, the
lower the wages are.
A Leviathan chooses the land rent tax rates which maximize his fiscal
budget surplus. As he takes into account, the tax base depends directly
and indirectly on his own policy. His optimization problem looks exactly as
follows:
max
τlo
Slo = τlorlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)L¯ho(1− α¯lo). (18)
The solution is:
τlo = − rlo∂rlo
∂pho
∂pho
∂τlo
+ ∂rlo
∂τlo
⇒ lo = −1. (19)
Thus, a Leviathan fixes the tax rate to the point where the elasticitiy of
the land rent is (minus) unity.
The total equilibrium with land rent taxation can be described by two
conditions. These combine and specify the five conditions of the general
framework.
First:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)), phj(~Gj))
hso=j(kh(pho(τlo, Go)))
. (20)
This means: The total number of households in the local economy must equal
the sum of all housing consumers. The individual housing demand in region
j depends on the household’s land rent from region o and the housing price
in region j. The number of households in j (Nj) must equal the total housing
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demand divided by the individual housing supply. The housing supply is
determined by the optimal capital input, determined in stage 1.
Second:
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)), phj(~Gj), Gj). (21)
Every household in the economy must reach the same, maximum level of
utility. The indirect utility depends on the household’s land rent from region
o, the housing price in j, and the supply of local public goods in j.
From these two conditions, we get the following sensitivity results:
dpho
dτlo
= −∂pho
∂τlo
> 0; (22)
dphj
dτlo
=
phoho − r¯kkho
(1 + τlo)2
∂vj
∂yo
∂vj
∂phj
< 0. (23)
Thus: Since we assume that the partial response of the internal hous-
ing price on a land rent tax change is negative, the total response must be
positive. The respective total response of the external housing price is, by
contrast, negative. The extent of this response negatively depends on the
wages and on the capital rent.
3.3 Taxation of Housing Capital Rent
In stage 1, housing is produced, namely by two factors: land and housing
capital. The latter factor is traded on a global market. For our local economy,
its supply is perfectly elastic. A local housing firm can thus demand any
amount at a fixed price. Because the local supply of land is fixed, the amount
of housing capital input completely determines the housing supply. Because
a citizen can only consume local public goods where she resides, the housing
capital input influences the demand for these goods. Due to congestion, it
may be necessary to regulate this demand. Hence, it could be expedient to
impose a tax on the capital rent. Such a tax forms a link between housing
supply, local public goods consumption, and fiscal revenue. Next, we shall
examine the effects of the capital rent tax, in more details.
A housing firm chooses the amount of capital input which maximizes its
profit. For this input, it pays an exogenously determined price plus the local
tax. Since capital is its only variable input, the firm cannot avoid the tax
payment by factor substitution. In formal terms, its optimization problem
and the solution are described as follows:
max
kho
piho = pho(τko, Go)ho(kho, l¯ho)− r¯k(1 + τko)kho − rlol¯ho; (24)
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r¯k(1 + τko) = pho
(
∂ho
∂kho
)
. (25)
Thus, the housing firm increases its capital input until its value of the
marginal product equals the gross capital rent. This optimum leads to the
following sensitivity on tax rate changes:
dkho
dτko
=
r¯k − ∂pho∂τko ∂ho∂kho
pho
∂2ho
∂k2ho
< 0. (26)
This means: A housing firm negatively responds to a change of the capital
rent tax. The response will be the higher, the higher the price level on the
global capital market is.
A capital rent tax affects a household’s behavior via its income constraint.
Here, its income from land ownership is:
rlol¯ho = pho(τko, Go)ho(kho(pho(τko, Go)))− r¯k(1 + τko)kho(pho(τko, Go)).
The sensitivity results thus become:
dxj1
dτko
= 0; (27)
dxj2
dτko
= 0; (28)
dhj
dτko
= − r¯kkho − ho
∂pho
∂τko
phj
< 0; (29)
dγ1
dτko
= −(1− γ1)
r¯kkho − ho ∂pho∂τko
yo
< 0. (30)
We find out the following: A change of the capital rent tax leaves the
composite private goods consumption unaffected. By contrast, such a change
affects the consumption of housing and the share of first-period expenditure
negatively. The impact on the housing consumption positively depends on
the capital rent level. The impact on the share of first-period expenditure
positively depends on this level, and negatively on the wage level.
If a Leviathan seeks to maximize his budget surplus from a capital rent
tax, then he has to consider the responses of the capital input. His optimiza-
tion problem is:
max
τko
Sko = τkor¯kokho(pho(τko, Go), τko)No(1− α¯ko). (31)
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In his optimum:
τko = − kho∂kho
∂pho
∂pho
∂τko
+ ∂kho
∂τko
⇒ ko = −1. (32)
Hence, the fiscal budget surplus reaches its maximum at a point where
the elasticity of the capital with respect to the capital rent tax rate is (minus)
unity. A response to a tax rate change may come from two directions: first,
the housing firms adapt the capital input; second, the households adapt their
housing demand.
Our local economy with capital rent taxes reaches a total equilibrium, if
the following two conditions are satisfied:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(τko, Go), τko)), phj(~Gj))
ho=j(kh(pho(τko, Go)))
; (33)
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(τko, Go), τko)), phj(~Gj), Gj). (34)
Formally, the sensitivity of the intraregional and of the interregional hous-
ing markets is described by:
dpho
dτko
= −∂pho
∂τko
> 0; (35)
dphj
dτko
= r¯kkho
∂vj
∂yo
∂vj
∂phj
< 0. (36)
The internal housing price positively responds to a change of the capital
rent tax. The total response just reverses the sign of the partial response.
The external housing price, by contrast, negatively responds to such a change.
This response will be the higher, the higher the capital rent and the lower
the wage level is.
3.4 Taxation of Housing Sales
In stage 2, the regional boundaries are opened. The households are free to
choose the fiscal package which they find best. But, such a choice induces
a corresponding demand for housing. Thus, each interregional housing price
depends on the whole set of local fiscal packages. We can say that the local
fiscal packages ’capitalize’ into the housing prices. To improve the interplay
between the housing markets and the market for local public goods, it seems
expedient to create a link between capitalization and fiscal revenue. One
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possible instrument for this is a sales tax. A sales tax directs a share of the
housing price to the fiscal budget. It serves as an entry or exit fee. Next,
we shall examine how this particularly affects decisions and equilibria in our
local economy.
A housing firm makes its decisions in stage 1, based on the intraregional
housing price. Since a sales tax is imposed only in stage 2, based on the
interregional housing price, the housing firm remains unaffected.
When a household migrates to a region j, it demands a certain amount
of housing and pays the gross interregional housing price. After that, it
can start its consumption. The household optimizes its consumption in the
following way:
max
xj1,xj2,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(xj1, hj) + βu2(xj2, hj) + ug(Gj) (37)
subject to
yo = yo1 + yo2 = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ phoho − r¯kkho (38)
where
yo1 = γ1yo = p¯xxj1 + phj(~τsj, ~Gj)(1 + τsj)hj; (39)
yo2 = (1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)yo = p¯xxj2. (40)
It responds to a change of the sales tax rate as follows: If
phj > −(1 + τsj)∂phj
∂τsj
; (41)
then
dxj1
dτsj
=
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
p¯x
∂uj1
∂hj
> 0; (42)
dhj
dτsj
= −
2 + hj
∂uj1
∂hj
1 + τsj
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
phj
∂uj1
∂hj
< 0; (43)
dγ1
dτsj
= −
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
yo
∂uj1
∂hj
< 0. (44)
Moreover,
dxj2
dτsj
= (1 + r¯y)
dx1j
dτsj
. (45)
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Hence, under the condition that the net external housing price is greater
than the partial derivative of the gross price with respect to the tax rate,
the household’s responses to an increase of the sales tax rate (et vice versa)
are: First, it increases the first-period consumption of the composite pri-
vate good. The extent of this response negatively depends on the price for
this good. Second, it increases the second-period consumption of the com-
posite private good. The extent of this response negatively depends on the
respective price, and positively on the interest rate. Third, it decreases the
housing consumption. And finally, the household decreases the share of the
first-period expenditure. The extent of this response negatively depends on
the wage level.
In order to maximize his fiscal budget surplus from a sales tax, a Le-
viathan must take into account each fiscal package in the whole economy.
Only then, he is able to predict the relevant housing price. His optimization
calculus with a sales tax formally looks as follows:
max
τsj
Ssj = τsjphj(~τsj, ~Gj)Hj(1− α¯sj); (46)
τsj = − phj∂phj
∂τsj
⇒ sj = −1. (47)
Again, a Leviathan searches for the point where the relevant tax elasticity
equals -1. Here, the relevant tax elasticity refers to the interregional housing
price. Hence, it also arises from the coordination of all housing markets in
our local economy.
Our local economy with housing sales taxes reaches a total equilibrium
under two specified conditions. The sales taxes are imposed on the interre-
gional housing prices in stage 2. The intraregional prices are determined in
stage 1. It thus seems plausible that a change of a sales tax has no effect on
the latter prices. From our formal analysis, we get:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τsj, ~Gj)(1 + τsj))
hso(kh(pho(Go)))
(48)
and
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τsj, ~Gj)(1 + τsj), Gj). (49)
dpho
dτsj
= 0; (50)
dphj
dτsj
= − phj
1 + τsj
− ∂phj
∂τsj
< 0 if (51)
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phj > −(1 + τsj)∂phj
∂τsj
.
In fact, an intraregional housing price does not respond, if a Leviathan
announces a change of his sales tax rate. There is no anticipation. The
response of an interregional housing price depends on a condition. If the net
price is greater than the relevant partial derivative of the gross price, then
the net price responds negatively.
3.5 Taxation of Housing Property
In stage 2, the households distribute their life-time incomes over two periods.
In order to better conform to the distribution, it could be expedient to impose
a tax in each period. One type of a multi-period tax is a (housing) property
tax. Such a tax relates to the housing value in each period. It works similar
to a member fee. It creates a link between the consumption of and the
financing of local public goods. However, the households are not totally free
in their consumption. The housing that they consume in the second period
must be the same as in the first one. Therefore, it seems necessary that the
government commits to the second period taxation, already in the first one.
For simplicity, we assume that the tax rates in both periods are identical.
Next, we shall see which sensitivity is engendered by such a property tax.
Based on the intraregional housing price, a housing firm makes its deci-
sions in stage 1. Thus, it does not respond to a change of the property tax
rate.
A household now integrates a second period tax payment into its con-
sumption plans. This tax payment also determines its migration decision in
the first period. The consumption plans get the follwing form:
max
xj1,xj2,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(xj1, hj) + βu2(xj2, hj) + ug(Gj) (52)
subject to
yo = yo1 + yo2 = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ phoho − r¯kkho;
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xxj1 + phj(~τvj, ~Gj)(1 + τvj)hj;
y2o = (1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)yo = p¯xxj2 + phj(~τvj, ~Gj)τvjhj.
The sensitivity results are: If
phj > −1 + r¯y
2 + r¯y
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
;
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then
dxj1
dτvj
=
((
2+r¯y
1+r¯y
phj
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)
Ωv1
p¯x
∂u1
∂hj
> 0; (53)
and
dhj
dτvj
= −
((
2+r¯y
1+r¯y
phj
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)
Ωv2
phj
∂u1
∂hj
< 0. (54)
Moreover,
dxj2
dτvj
= (1 + r¯y)
dxj1
dτvj
; (55)
and
dγ1
dτvj
= −
Ωv3phj + Ωv4
∂phj
∂τvj
+ Ωv5
yo
∂uj1
∂hj
≤ 0 or > 0. (56)
This is because, all Ωv > 0. As we can see, a property tax induces more
complicated responses by a household. In relation to the distribuion of its life
time income, we even cannot predict the direction of its response, anymore.
Under the condition that the net housing price is greater than the time-
weighted partial derivative of the gross price with respect to the tax rate, a
change of the tax rate leads to: first, a positive response of the first-period
consumption of the composite private good; which is negatively related to its
price level; second, a positive response of the second-period consumption of
this good; which is negatively related to its price level and positively to the
interest rate. and third, a negative response of the housing consumption.
In our local economy, a Leviathan provides his local public goods as one
’shot’, at the beginning of the first period. For this shot, he spends a constant
share of his total fiscal revenue. Thus, the Leviathan needs to pre-finance the
revenue from the second period property tax. He can do this on the global
financial market. He maximizes his property tax revenue in the following
way:
max
τvj
Svj =
(
τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
phj(~τvj, ~Gj)Hj(1− α¯vj); (57)
τvj = − phj∂pho
∂τvj
⇒ vj = −1. (58)
Again, the Leviathan takes the point where the relevant tax elasticity
equals -1. Despite of the multi-period character of the property tax, the
optimum point does not directly depend on the interest rate.
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Our local economy with property taxation reaches an equilibrium, if:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o hj
(
yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τvj, ~Gj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
))
ho(ksh(pho(~τvj,
~Go)))
; (59)
u∗ = vj
(
yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τvj, ~Gj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
, Gj
)
; (60)
The relevant sensitivity result is:
dphj
dτvj
= −2 + r¯y
1 + r¯y
phj
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
− ∂phj
∂τvj
< 0 if (61)
phj > −1 + r¯y
2 + r¯y
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
.
Thus, we encounter the same condition as for the households’ sensitivity.
If the net housing price is greater than the time-weighted partial derivative of
the gross housing price with respect to the tax rate, then this price responds
negatively to a property tax rate change.
4 Evaluation Results
What we search for is an appropriate tax base for local Leviathans. We
evaluate the appropriateness according to four criteria: efficiency, simplic-
ity, flexibilty, and fairness. Based on a discussion of the citizens’ modes of
reaction, the Tiebout mechanism, the fact of location, and externalities, we
led our attention to four distinct local tax bases: land rent, housing capi-
tal rent, housing sales, and housing properties. To better understand the
characteristics of these tax bases, we constructed a two stage model of local
taxation. This model describes three types of agents in a local economy. The
interaction is structured into two stages and two periods. Some simplifying
assumptions are further made on: wages, private consumption, tax tariffs,
and local public expenditure. Thus, the model allows to analyze the sensitiv-
ity of households, housing firms, and housing markets on tax rate changes.
Based on this model, we finally seek to evalutate the chosen local tax bases.
First, the land rent: A land rent tax incurs inefficiencies in the input of
housing capital, the housing demand, and the distribution of the private in-
come over time. The consumption of other private goods remains unaffected.
Since the land rent negatively depends on the internal tax rate and positively
on the internal public goods, the share of revenue spent on local public goods
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may tend to be high. As a residual value, a land rent cannot be directly ob-
served. In reality, it could be possible that a housing firm manipulates its
value. A land rent tax is rather flexible. It influences the intra- and the
interregional housing price. The extent of the influence negatively depends
on the housing capital rent and the wage. A land rent tax can be judged
as being fair. It puts a burden on the households according to their initial
endowments and their incomes. Thus, it could be accepted by all citizens
behind a veil of ignorance.
Second, the housing capital rent: A housing capital rent tax incurs inef-
ficiencies in the housing production and demand, the consumption structure
over time; but not in the composite private goods consumption. While the
capital rent is taken as exogenous, a Leviathan sets every endogenous vari-
able for the determination of the capital input. Thus, the tax waste may tend
to be low. The term ’housing capital’ comprises any sort of input, except
land. In reality, the inputs may be highly heterogeneous and thus difficult to
capture. A capital rent tax takes influence on both types of housing prices;
which depends on the capital rent and the wage, in a straight forward man-
ner. Thus, this tax can be judged as particularly flexible. Moreover, it can be
judged as being rather fair. Its burden is taken by the households according
to their housing ownership.
Third, the housing sales: A housing sales tax distorts each consumption
decision. The direction in which the decisions change is dependent on the
shape of the housing price function. However, the housing production is
not affected. This is because consumption and production base on different
housing prices. Since a Leviathan competes in the period of taxation with
all the others, there will be no room for tax waste. The housing sales tax
appears as a simple wedge between the gross and the net interregional housing
price. The extent to which a change of the tax rate influences the housing
price (in a positive or negative direction), depends on the parameters of the
housing price function, alone. The sales tax can be judged as fair in the sense
that each household contributes to the local public goods which it actually
consumes.
And finally, the housing property: A housing property tax distorts the
consumption of private composite goods and of housing. The sign of these
distortions depend on the housing price function and the interest rate. Thus,
the distortion in the distribution of the income over time tends to remain
small but difficult to predict. Due to the competition among the Leviathans,
it will be impossible to waste tax revenue. However, in reality, there may
arise a discrepancy between the housing price and its value in later periods. If
the housing is not sold, its value can only be estimated. The extent to which
the housing price responds to a tax rate change depends on the parameters
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of the housing price function and the interest rate, but not explicitly on the
wages or other prices. Behind a veil of ignorance, a housing property may
appear as a rather uncertain tax base. Whether it will turn out to be fair
depends on the efficiency of the financial capital market, time structure of
the local public goods, and the commitment of the Leivathans.
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Appendix
Computation for 3.2
Fl1 = pho(τlo, Go)
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k = 0
dkho
dτlo
= −
∂Fl1
∂τlo
∂Fl1
∂kho
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Al1dl1 = zl1 ⇒ A−1l1 zl1 = dl1
Al1 =

∂2u1
∂x21j
0 ∂
2u1
∂x1j∂hj
0
−p¯x 0
0 β ∂
2u2
∂x22j
β ∂
2u2
∂x2j∂hj
0
0 −p¯x
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
β ∂
2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
+ β ∂
2u2
∂h2j
0
−phj 0
0 0 0 0
1 −(1 + r¯y)
−p¯x 0 −phj yo
0 0
0 −p¯x 0 −(1 + r¯y)yo
0 0

dl1 =

dx1j/dτlo
dx2j/dτlo
dhj/dτlo
dγ1/dτlo
dλ1/dτlo
dλ2/dτlo

zl1 =

0
0
0
0
−γ1
[
∂pho
∂τlo
ho
1+τlo
− phoho−r¯kkho
(1+τlo)2
)
−(1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)
(
∂pho
∂τlo
ho
1+τlo
− phoho−r¯kkho
(1+τlo)2
)

∂2u1
∂x21j
=
p¯x
phj
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
∂2u2
∂x22j
=
p¯x
phj(1 + r¯y)
∂2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
= (1 + r¯y)β
∂2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
=
phj
p¯x
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
− β∂
2u2
∂h2j
Al2dl2 = zl2 ⇒ A−1l2 zl2 = dl2
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Al2 =
 ∂vj∂yo ho1+τlo ∂vj∂phjP
o
∂hj
∂yo
1+τlo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho

dl2 =
[
dpho/dτlo
dphj/dτlo
]
zl2 =
 −
∂vj
∂yo
(
ho
∂pho
∂τlo
1+τlo
− phoho−r¯kkho
(1+τlo)2
)
− 1
ho
∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
(
ho
∂pho
∂τlo
1+τlo
− phoho−r¯kkho
(1+τlo)2
)
+
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
∂pho
∂τlo
h2lo

Computations for 3.3
Fk1 = pho(τlo, Go)
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k(1 + τko) = 0
dkho
dτko
= −
∂Fk1
∂τko
∂Fk1
∂kho
Ak1dk1 = zk1 ⇒ A−1k1 zk1 = dk1
Ak1 = Al1
dk1 =

dx1j/dτko
dx2j/dτko
dhj/dτko
dγ1/dτko
dλ1/dτko
dλ2/dτko

zk1 =

0
0
0
0
γ1r¯ykho
(1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)r¯kkho

Ak2dk2 = zk2 ⇒ A−1k2 zk2 = dk2
Ak2 =
 ∂vj∂yoho ∂vj∂phj∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho

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dl2 =
[
dpho/dτko
dphj/dτko
]
zl2 =
 − ∂vj∂yo (ho ∂pho∂τko − r¯kkho)
1
h2o
∑
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
(
∂kho
∂τko
+ ∂kho
∂pho
∂pho
∂τko
)
− 1
ho
∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
(
ho
∂pho
∂τko
− r¯kkho
) 
Computations for 3.4
As1ds1 = zs1 ⇒ A−1s1 zs1 = ds1
As1 =

∂2u1
∂x21j
0 ∂
2u1
∂x1j∂hj
0
−p¯x 0
0 β ∂
2u2
∂x22j
β ∂
2u2
∂x2j∂hj
0
0 −p¯x
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
β ∂
2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
+ β ∂
2u2
∂h2j
0
−phj(1 + τsj) 0
0 0 0 0
1 −(1 + r¯y)
−p¯x 0 −phj(1 + τsj) yo
0 0
0 −p¯x 0 −(1 + r¯y)yo
0 0

ds1 =

dx1j/dτsj
dx2j/dτsj
dhj/dτsj
dγ1/dτsj
dλ1/dτsj
dλ2/dτsj

zs1 =

0
0
λ1
(
∂phj
∂τsj
(1 + τsj) + phj
)
0
hj
(
∂phj
∂τsj
(1 + τsj) + phj
)
0

∂2u1
∂x21j
=
p¯x
phj(1 + τsj)
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
∂2u2
∂x22j
=
p¯x
phj(1 + τsj)(1 + r¯y)
∂2u2
∂hj∂x2j
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∂2u1
∂h2j
=
phj(1 + τsj)
p¯x
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
− β∂
2u2
∂h2j
As2ds2 = zs2 ⇒ A−1s2 zs2 = ds2
As2 =
 ∂vj∂yoho (1 + τsj) ∂vj∂phj∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
(1 + τsj)
P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho

ds2 =
[
dpho/dτsj
dphj/dτsj
]
zs2 =
 − ∂vj∂phj (phj + (1 + τsj)∂phj∂τko)
−∑o ∂ho∂phj 1ho (phj + (1 + τsj)∂phj∂τko)

Computations for 3.5
Av1dv1 = zv1 ⇒ A−1v1 zv1 = dv1
Av1 =

∂2u1
∂x21j
0 ∂
2u1
∂x1j∂hj
0
−p¯x 0
0 β ∂
2u2
∂x22j
β ∂
2u2
∂x2j∂hj
0
0 −p¯x
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
β ∂
2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
+ β ∂
2u2
∂h2j
0
−phj(1 + τvj) 0
0 0 0 0
1 −(1 + r¯y)
−p¯x 0 −phj(1 + τvj) yo
0 0
0 −p¯x −phjτvj −(1 + r¯y)yo
0 0

dv1 =

dx1j/dτvj
dx2j/dτvj
dhj/dτvj
dγ1/dτvj
dλ1/dτvj
dλ2/dτvj

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zv1 =

0
0
λ1
(
∂phj
∂τvj
(1 + τvj) + phj
)
+ λ2
(
∂phj
∂τvj
τvj + phj
)
0
hj
(
∂phj
∂τvj
(1 + τvj) + phj
)
hj
(
∂phj
∂τvj
τvj + phj
)

∂2u1
∂x21j
=
p¯x
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) ∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
∂2u2
∂x22j
=
p¯x
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) ∂2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
=
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
p¯x
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
− β∂
2u2
∂h2j
Ωv1 =
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
+
τvj
1+r¯k
hj
∂u1j
∂hj
1 + τvj
Ωv2 =
2 + hj
∂u1j
∂hj
1 + τvj
+
τvjhj
∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + τvj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
(1 + r¯k)
Ωv3 =
(2 + r¯y)
(
1 + 2τvj + (2r¯y + r¯
2
y)(1 + τvj)
2
)
(1 + r¯2y)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
Ωv4 =
1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj + τvjhj
∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + r¯2k)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
∗
∗ 1 + 2τvj + (2r¯k + r¯
2
y)(1 + τvj)
2
(1 + y¯2k)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
Ωv5 =
hj
(
(1 + 3τvj + r¯
2
y(1 + τvj)
2 + r¯k(2 + 5τvj + 2τ
2
vj)
) ∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + r¯2y)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
Av2dv2 = zv2 ⇒ A−1v2 zv2 = dv2
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Av2 =
 ∂vj∂yoho
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
∂vj
∂phj∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho

dl2 =
[
dpho/dτvj
dphj/dτvj
]
zv2 =
 − ∂vj∂phj (phj (1 + 11+r¯y)+ (1 + τvj + τvj1+r¯y) ∂phj∂τvj )
−∑o ∂ho∂phj 1ho (phj (1 + 11+r¯y)+ (1 + τvj + τvj1+r¯y) ∂phj∂τvj )

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